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Extraterritoriality and the Rule of Law: Why 
Friendly Foreign Democracies Oppose Novel, 
Expansive U.S. Jurisdiction Claims by Non-
Resident Aliens Under the Alien Tort Statute* 
 
DONALD I. BAKER
†
 
 
 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
1
 has implicated two basic 
foreign policy concerns among some of America‘s most important 
allies. The first concern is about human rights around the world, and 
how to develop and effectively implement collective and unilateral 
measures for discovering, punishing, and deterring those engaged in 
committing basic human rights violations.
2
 The second concern is the 
widely-shared view that the United States has adopted an overly 
expansive view of extraterritorial jurisdiction combined with a unique 
plaintiff-favoring litigation system, which encourages improper 
forum shopping by private litigants seeking to win cases against 
 
* © 2013 by Baker & Miller PLLC. Based on a talk delivered at the symposium 
Extraterritoriality Post-Kiobel: International and Comparative Legal Perspectives at the 
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, Baltimore, Maryland on 
November 16, 2012. 
† Partner, Baker & Miller PLLC; Professorial Lecturer in Law, The George Washington 
University Law School. Counsel of Record for the Governments of United Kingdom, 
Netherlands, Australia, and/or Switzerland as amici curiae in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); Rio Tinto, PLC v. Sarei, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 
2011); Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010); and Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). However, the views expressed are entirely based on 
my own experience and do not purport to be on behalf of any government that we may have 
represented in these or other cases involving U.S. assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
1. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
2. See FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, HM GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS TOOLKIT: HOW UK OVERSEAS MISSIONS CAN PROMOTE GOOD CONDUCT BY 
UK COMPANIES (2011); see also MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT OF THE 
NETHERLANDS, HUMAN RIGHTS MEMORANDUM: RESPONSIBLE FOR FREEDOM 23 (2011). 
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foreign defendants based on a limited or non-existent nexus with the 
United States.
3
 
Moreover, on the human rights front, there appears to be 
stronger political and official support in foreign capitals for treaty-
based cooperation arrangements with government-to-government 
sanctions, such as trade embargos, which are more direct and 
effective ways of punishing and deterring human rights violations by 
a wrongdoing state.
4
 In addition, the United States is quietly 
criticized in the international legal community for being unique 
among leading democracies in having failed to support the creation of 
the International Criminal Court, which is seen as a more focused 
way of dealing with the worst human rights violators. 
Under these circumstances, the Australian, British, and Dutch 
governments have been leaders in trying to get the U.S. Supreme 
Court to squarely face the issue of the proper limits on national 
jurisdiction imposed by international law on private damage cases 
brought under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).
5
 The United Kingdom 
and Netherlands were finally successful with their first brief in 
Kiobel.
6
  
These foreign governments‘ basic argument in their briefs has 
been that preserving the traditional international law restrictions on 
 
3. Brief of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 
26–29, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491) [hereinafter Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II] (―The 
risks of improper interference with the rights of foreign sovereigns are significantly 
enhanced in ATS (and other) cases because the U.S. has chosen to adopt plaintiff-favoring 
rules and remedies that other nations do not accept [as a matter of public policy][.]‖). 
4. Id. at 34–36 (―Protection against human rights abuses can be more fairly and 
effectively achieved by seeking international consensus and cooperation through treaties 
than by resort to private civil litigation in distant courts[.]‖). 
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). See Brief of the Governments of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, the Swiss Confederation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner at 15–18, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 
U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339); Brief of the Governments of Australia and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners 
on Certain Questions in their Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15–18, Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 
PLC, No. 11-649 (U.S. filed Dec. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Austl.–U.K. Rio Tinto Cert. Br.]. 
6. Brief of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondents 
at 29–33, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491) [hereinafter Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. I] 
(―These numerous A.T.S. actions against foreign corporations for activities that have no 
significant nexus with the U.S. reemphasize the importance of this court taking the first 
available opportunity to make clear to the lower courts that an A.T.S. case should not be 
allowed to proceed unless it can satisfy the basic limitation on national civil jurisdiction 
imposed by international law[.]‖). 
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extraterritorial jurisdiction by U.S. courts is a more important policy 
goal because it is consistent with the active pursuit of other 
government-to-government initiatives that deal more directly with 
human rights violations in faraway places.
7
 This choice is consistent 
with the position taken by the U.S. government‘s earlier amicus 
briefs on international law and comity in the ATS cases.
8
 The U.S. 
Solicitor General‘s second brief in Kiobel argued against U.S. 
jurisdiction where foreign plaintiffs are suing foreign defendants for 
foreign actions, while leaving the door open to possible assertions of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in ATS cases where the defendants were 
American individuals or companies, or the foreign plaintiff was a 
U.S. resident.
9
 When the Supreme Court issued its Kiobel decision on 
April 17, 2013, all nine Justices accepted the Anglo-Dutch position, 
with the Chief Justice‘s opinion for five Justices going somewhat 
further in excluding foreign plaintiffs‘ ATS claims from the U.S. 
courts.
10
 
 
7. Id. at 25–27 (―Protection against human rights abuses can be more fairly and 
effectively done by seeking international consensus [on ways to further improve the 
protection of human rights] and [by] encouraging states to [implement] domestic legislation 
that [enables them to carry out] their obligations under international human rights 
instruments [to which they are party] within their jurisdiction[.]‖). 
8. See generally Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, Supporting 
Affirmance of the Order of Dismissal, Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(Nos. 09-56381, 02-56256, 02-56390) (outlining the U.S. position in ATS cases that federal 
law must comply with international law); Reply Brief for the United States at 5, Sosa, 542 
U.S. 692 (No. 03-484) (asserting that it is the job of the Executive Branch to ensure that law 
enforcement tactics comply with international law). 
9. Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of 
Affirmance at 25–26, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491) [hereinafter U.S. Kiobel Br. II]. 
This brief is more extensively discussed in Part VI below. The Solicitor General‘s initial 
brief in Kiobel, signed by the State and Commerce Departments, had supported the 
Petitioners on the question of corporate liability. Brief of the United in Support of Petitioners 
at 12–13, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491) [hereinafter U.S. Kiobel Br. I].  
10. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. Justice Breyer‘s somewhat more tailored concurring 
opinion pointed to the second Dutch-British brief as recognizing a few narrow exceptions to 
the almost pure territoriality approach adopted by the majority. Id. at 1675–76 (Breyer, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (citing Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 3, at 15–16, 19–
23). These limited exceptions involved potential suits for overseas torts based on nationality 
principles or the presence of defendant individuals in the territory of the forum state. Justice 
Breyer‘s opinion, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, was seen 
as an apparent effort to get the Court and the lower courts to stick more closely to the 
cautious balancing which characterized Justice Soutor‘s majority opinion in Sosa. It seems 
likely that he was trying to persuade Justice Kennedy to join, and thus have this opinion 
become the majority opinion for the Court in Kiobel. 
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I. TRADITIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW   
Ever since Chief Justice Marshall‘s early decisions involving 
international shipping disputes, the Supreme Court has recognized 
that international law places important limitations on the ability of the 
U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction over overseas individuals and 
situations.
11
  
Basically, international law has long provided that a sovereign 
should only exercise civil jurisdiction over legal wrongs occurring 
within its territory or at least having a substantial nexus with its 
territory, citizens, and/or residents. Broader jurisdiction has long been 
accepted for conduct occurring on the high seas, including piracy, on 
the theory that such an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction was 
necessary if such wrongdoers were to be punished and it did not 
infringe the jurisdiction of another sovereign.
12
 In the twentieth 
century, the United States generated periodic diplomatic and legal 
conflicts by going a step further and developing and using the so-
called ―effects doctrine‖ to exercise national jurisdiction over foreign 
parties for overseas activities that have a significant effect within 
U.S. territory.
13
 Gradually, this concept has come to be more broadly 
accepted and used by other major jurisdictions, when seen as ―part of 
a single broad principle according to which the right to exercise 
jurisdiction depends on there being between the subject matter and 
the state exercising jurisdiction a sufficiently close connection to 
justify that state in regulating the matter and perhaps also to override 
any competing rights of other states.‖14 
 
11. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (―[A]n 
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other 
possible construction remains,‖ unless the act contains ―express words or a very plain and 
necessary implication [to the contrary].‖); Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 
116, 136 (1812) (―The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily 
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself.‖); The 
Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825) (―No principle of general law is more 
universally acknowledged, than the perfect equality of nations. Russia and Geneva have 
equal rights. It results from this equality, that no one can rightfully impose a rule on 
another.‖). 
12. Because piracy was an activity occurring on the high seas, ATS cases based on 
piracy would not involve the U.S. courts attempting to exercise jurisdiction over conduct that 
occurred in territory of a foreign sovereign. See Eugene Kontorovich, A Tort Statute, With 
Aliens and Pirates, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COL. 100, 102–03 (2012) (discussing the impact of 
piracy on the creation and interpretation of the ATS). 
13. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (illustrating the 
effects doctrine). 
14. LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM‘S INTERNATIONAL LAW 457–58 (Sir Robert Jennings 
& Sir Arthur Watts eds., Longmans 9th ed. 1992) (1905) (emphasis added). 
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For generations, diplomatic tensions stemming from U.S. 
assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction over non-resident foreign 
parties have been intensified because the United States has chosen to 
create a legal system that is far more favorable to private plaintiffs 
than anything that any major foreign power has chosen to adopt. The 
pro-plaintiff litigation advantages consist of potential punitive 
damages, mandatory jury trials in civil damages cases, opt-out class 
actions, unregulated contingent fees, and the ―American‖ cost rule 
that does not require a plaintiff to pay a successful defendant‘s 
litigation costs.
15
 This combination necessarily attracts big-ticket 
private cases to the United States, even when the factual nexus to the 
United States is tenuous or almost non-existent. 
In response, foreign governments have filed numerous amicus 
briefs over the years, urging the U.S. appellate courts to curb what 
they regard as ―judicial imperialism‖ by U.S. courts in private civil 
cases under other federal statutes.
16
 These briefs have become more 
successful in recent years in persuading the U.S. Supreme Court to 
reject U.S. jurisdiction over commercial cases by non-citizens 
claiming damages for foreign conduct. The most prominent examples 
are F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.,
17
 where the Court 
rejected foreign purchasers‘ Sherman Act antitrust claims, and 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,
18
 where the Court rejected 
 
15. See W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why Is 
the United States the “Odd Man Out” In How It Pays Its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT‘L & 
COMP. L. 361, 381–88 (1999) (discussing international disfavor with the contingency fee 
system and highlighting foreign alternatives); see also Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II, supra 
note 3, at 26–29 (discussing the plaintiff-favoring rules adopted by the United States). 
16. In Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. 764, the United Kingdom and Canada filed amicus briefs 
in support of the foreign defendants on the issue of jurisdiction. See Brief for the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Petitioners, Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. 764 (Nos. 91-1111, 91-1128); Brief of the 
Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae in Support of Certain Petitioners, Hartford Fire, 
509 U.S. 764 (Nos. 91-1111, 91-1128). 
17. 542 U.S. 155 (2004). Multiple governments filed amicus briefs in support of reversal 
in Empagran. See, e.g., Brief of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and 
Belgium as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724); 
Brief for the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, Empagran, 542 
U.S. 155 (No. 03-724); Brief of the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724). 
18. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). Multiple governments filed amicus briefs in support of the 
defendant in Morrison. See, e.g., Brief for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Respondents, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191); Brief of the Government 
of the Commonwealth of Australia as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Defendants–
Appellees, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191); Brief of the United Kingdom of Great 
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non-resident foreign shareholders‘ securities claims based on the 
Securities Exchange Act. 
Kiobel differed from these earlier cases in a few respects. First, 
the plaintiffs were alleging rather generalized wrongs as opposed to 
specific cartel overcharges or market-distorting misrepresentations. 
Second, the non-resident class of plaintiffs would be harder to 
identify and manage by U.S. courts and their losses will be more 
difficult to identify and quantify than losses suffered by overseas 
purchasers of products or securities. These realities underscore the 
basic question raised by Kiobel: why should international law on 
extraterritorial jurisdiction somehow be watered down because the 
non-resident alien plaintiffs are claiming compensation for human 
rights injuries suffered abroad, rather than for the types of 
commercial injuries one finds in antitrust or securities cases? Asking 
this question generates a series of significant underlying questions 
not only about international law but also about the history and 
purpose of the ATS, as well as its efficacy and fairness as a device 
for compensating the victims of foreign human rights wrongs. 
II. THE GOALS OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
The ATS was enacted by the first Congress in 1789 under the 
newly-adopted U.S. Constitution. Its origins and goals are both 
obscure and seemingly limited. In the wake of several attacks on 
foreign ambassadors to the new nation, Congress apparently wanted 
to enable injured ambassadors to recover damages without having to 
rely on state courts.
19
 In addition, there were ongoing disputes over 
foreign ships that had been seized or damaged during the 
Revolutionary War.
20
 Finally, piracy on the high seas was already 
recognized as an exception to the normal territoriality-based rules and 
was therefore the one area where universal civil jurisdiction was 
already recognized under international law.
21
    
 
Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Morrison, 130 
S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191). 
19. See William R. Casto, The Federal Courts‟ Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts 
Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 488–510 (1986). But 
see Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT‘L L. 587, 637–45 
(2002).  
20. See Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 
HASTINGS INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 445 (1995). 
21. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762 (Breyer, J., concurring) (―[I]n the 18th 
century, nations reached consensus not only on the substantive principle that acts of piracy 
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The Kiobel plaintiffs simply sought to have the Supreme Court 
adopt a new, expanded rule on extraterritorial jurisdiction for human 
rights victims that goes well beyond (1) traditional international law 
recognized by international tribunals and most foreign courts, and (2) 
the limits on extraterritorial jurisdiction that the modern Supreme 
Court has recognized in dealing with disputes involving claims under 
antitrust, securities, and other U.S. regulatory statutes. The plaintiffs‘ 
counsel and their supporting amici had to argue, in essence, that the 
ATS puts violations of ―the law of nations‖ on a different 
jurisdictional plane when foreign victims are claiming compensation 
for human rights injuries suffered abroad—as distinguished from 
commercial injuries that non-resident victims may suffer from a 
global cartel or securities fraud.
22
 
Approaching this type of litigation in a way that is sympathetic 
to victims still leaves us asking a series of significant questions about 
the statutory purposes and likely effectiveness of such an 
extraterritorial crusade: 
(a) What is the principal purpose of an ATS case like 
Kiobel being brought principally on behalf of 
alien, non-resident plaintiffs absent from the 
United States? To compensate the victims? Punish 
wrongdoers? Or to deter corporations from 
investing in poorer countries with ethnic conflicts, 
legal instability, and/or dodgy political leadership?  
(b) If the principal purpose is to compensate victims, 
how can this be practically accomplished when the 
plaintiff-victims are resident in the territory of the 
wrongdoing state found by a U.S. jury to have 
engaged in grievous violations of international 
law? Should the U.S. jury still be awarding 
damages to the non-resident victims if it has 
become quite clear that the wrongdoing 
government would not let payments flow through 
its payments systems to the thousands, possibly 
 
were universally wrong but also on the jurisdictional principle that any nation that found a 
pirate could prosecute him.‖).  
22. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Plaintiffs–Appellants–Cross-Appellees at 48–58, Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 06-4800, 06-4876). 
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millions, of local residents whom it has 
wronged?
23
  
(c) To the extent that a public purpose of ATS tort 
litigation is to deter prospective wrongdoers in the 
field, how effective is penalizing shareholders of a 
foreign corporation in causing lawless soldiers, 
militia, torturers, policemen, or jailers to refrain 
from acting cruelly on behalf of the wrongdoing 
state? Isn‘t this a second- or third-best alternative 
form of deterrence compared with using 
international law to punish or penalize the 
wrongdoing culprits directly under the Rome 
Convention establishing the International Criminal 
Court?
24
  
(d) If a major purpose of this type of ATS litigation is 
to pressure a government with a bad human rights 
record to change its ways by deterring major 
foreign investment in the country, doesn‘t such a 
campaign, if successful, just amount to a privately 
organized trade embargo—which may be 
consistent or inconsistent with ongoing diplomatic 
efforts by the United States and other democratic 
governments? Moreover, like a trade embargo, 
doesn‘t ATS litigation tend to primarily penalize 
the foreign residents who would be denied 
whatever jobs and other economic opportunities 
that the inbound investment or commerce might 
have generated?
25
  
 
23. Note that it is the foreign state that must be the central source of a violation under 
―the law of nations,‖ while corporations, which are the private plaintiffs‘ principal targets in 
an ATS civil damages case, are charged with being aiders and abettors of the sovereign‘s 
alleged wrongs.  
24. I have long believed that, in the antitrust field where I regularly work, just imposing 
large fines and damages on a corporation is an insufficient form of deterrence, and therefore 
it is necessary to provide direct, painful sanctions against the wrongdoing individuals who 
work or act on behalf of the corporation. See Donald I. Baker, Punishment for Cartel 
Participants in the U.S.: A Special Model?, in CRIMINALISING CARTELS (Caron Beaton-Wells 
& Ariel Ezrachi eds., 2011). In the ATS context, the point is even stronger because the 
principal wrongdoers are normally not employees or agents of the corporation being brought 
into the case as an aider or abettor. 
25. The post-apartheid South African Government has made this argument in opposing 
ATS claims based on the misdeeds of the former apartheid government. See Neth.–U.K. 
Kiobel Br. II, supra note 3, at 24–26; see also id. app. at 1a–15a (reprinting the Declaration 
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III. FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS HAVE REPEATEDLY OPPOSED HAVING 
U.S. COURTS EXERCISE EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER 
DISPUTES INVOLVING INJURIES CAUSED TO FOREIGN PARTIES 
OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES 
As already noted, the second Anglo–Dutch amicus brief in 
Kiobel is the latest in a long string of foreign government amicus 
briefs opposing U.S. exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction in civil 
cases brought by private plaintiffs in the U.S. courts.
26
 The ―Interest 
of the Amici‖ section in this recent brief articulates these 
fundamental jurisdictional concerns very clearly: 
The Governments . . . are committed to the rule of 
law, including the promotion of, and protection 
against violations of, human rights. . . .   
Nevertheless, just as international law imposes 
human rights obligations on States, it imposes 
restraints on the assertion of jurisdiction by one State 
over civil actions between persons that primarily 
concern another State. Jurisdictional restraints are a 
fundamental underpinning of the international legal 
order and are essential to maintaining international 
peace and comity. The Governments are, therefore, 
opposed to broad assertions of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over alien persons arising out of foreign 
disputes with little, or no, connection to the United 
States . . . . 
This brief is intended to set out the views of two 
nations that historically have been concerned with the 
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction by the U.S. 
courts because of its inconsistency with international 
law. . . . This brief is purely intended to set out the 
Governments‟ view of the most relevant international 
legal principles and takes no position on the 
 
by Penuell Mpapa Maduna, South African Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development of the Republic of South Africa, dated July 11, 2003, submitted in opposition 
to assertion of U.S. jurisdiction in In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1379 
(J.P.M.L. 2002)). 
26. See Brief of Amici Curiae BP America et al. in Support of Respondents app. at 1a–
6a, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) (listing the 
twenty-two amicus briefs and diplomatic notes opposing U.S. jurisdiction in ATS cases). 
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underlying factual and legal disputes between the 
parties to this particular case.
27
 
Later in their brief, the British and Dutch governments describe 
the legal responses of other foreign governments to ―what they 
regarded as entirely inappropriate exercises of U.S. extraterritorial 
jurisdiction by courts and, occasionally, by legislatures.‖28 The most 
dramatic part of the earlier history involved foreign parliaments 
enacting so-called ―blocking statutes‖ that (1) prevented a 
corporation subject to the foreign government‘s jurisdiction from 
providing information to a U.S. court in an extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, and/or (2) prevented the foreign sovereign‘s courts from 
recognizing certain U.S. judgments based on extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.
29
 These statutes, which were enacted by the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, France, South Africa, and several 
Canadian provinces in the 1980s, were triggered by intense foreign 
political and diplomatic reaction to private U.S. antitrust suits against 
foreign uranium producers that participated in a distressed-industry 
cartel orchestrated by the foreign governments.
30
 In addition, foreign 
courts have sometimes rejected discovery requests made by U.S. 
parties under the Hague Convention, when the foreign court has 
regarded the U.S. case on which the discovery request was based as 
resting on an improper assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the 
U.S. court.
31
  
Thus, Kiobel is only the latest chapter in a longstanding story 
about foreign government dissatisfaction with private U.S. litigation 
brought against foreign nationals for offshore conduct, particularly in 
the antitrust area. ―Fortunately,‖ the British and Dutch governments 
added in 2013, ―such disputes seem to have become considerably less 
frequent and dramatic in recent years.‖32 
 
27. Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 3, at 1–4 (emphasis added). 
28. Id. at 29. 
29. See, e.g., Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act 1984 (Cth) (Austl.); 
Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11 (U.K.); Foreign Extraterritorial Measures 
Act, 1985, R.S.C. c. F-29 (Can.). See generally Carl A. Cira, Jr., The Challenge of Foreign 
Laws to Block American Antitrust Actions, 18 STAN. J. INT‘L L. 247 (1982) (discussing the 
implementation of foreign blocking statutes). 
30. I know from being personally involved that the level of foreign government outrage 
was enhanced by the fact that the challenged cartel was created at the behest of the foreign 
governments in response to a U.S. embargo on foreign uranium imports designed to protect 
domestic U.S. uranium miners from additional competition in a distressed market.  
31. See, e.g., Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 
(H.L. 1977) (U.K.); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gulf Canada Ltd., [1980] 2 S.C.R. 39, 41 (Can.). 
32. Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 3, at 29. 
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IV. THE QUESTION OF COMITY 
A crucial aspect of the wave of ATS litigation is that it is often 
conducted by private lawyers with an economic incentive to litigate, 
regardless of the diplomatic difficulties they may cause for other 
human rights initiatives that sympathetic governments are pursuing. 
Unsurprisingly, other governmental amicus briefs in Kiobel, 
including those submitted by the U.S. Solicitor General and the 
European Commission, did not contemplate or advocate the kinds of 
unqualified universal jurisdiction advocated by the plaintiffs‘ counsel 
and some of their supporting amici in Kiobel.
33
 
The importance of comity is obvious. Imagine the likely U.S. 
political reaction if some foreign country with a very different legal 
system, for example China or Egypt, enacted a statute exercising 
universal jurisdiction over numerous U.S. and other non-resident 
foreign corporations for anything that its courts regard as ―human 
rights‖ violations (or ―blasphemy‖) anywhere in the world! 
What the foreign governments described in their Kiobel briefs is 
only part of a long-standing story about foreign government 
dissatisfaction with private U.S. litigation against foreign nationals 
for offshore conduct.
34
 The comity concern becomes clearer when a 
big foreign enterprise, like Royal Dutch Shell, is sued in U.S. courts 
for wrongs that occurred outside of the United States, and thereby 
able to defend itself under the more balanced litigation systems that 
the foreign sovereigns have established to resolve claims against their 
citizens, residents, and entrepreneurs.
35
 
The comity situation would be different if the U.S. courts only 
exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction against U.S. corporations for 
alleged human rights abuses in a faraway country, for then the 
 
33. For discussion of these briefs, see infra Part VI. The amicus brief submitted by the 
Argentine Government was also fairly focused on the extraterritorial jurisdiction of what I 
refer to as ―Individual Injury Cases‖ in Part V. See Brief for the Government of the 
Argentine Republic as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491).   
34. Brief for the Government of the Argentine Republic as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, supra note 33, at 11. 
35. Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 3, at 18–23 (discussing the extent to which 
Royal Dutch Shell, an Anglo–Dutch corporation, might be sued in the domestic courts in the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands). 
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―nationality‖ principle of jurisdiction could be brought into play.36 
Even so, this could require a more specific extraterritorial mandate 
than that present in the ATS because any such nationality-based 
jurisdictional claim would be subject to the presumption that U.S. 
statutes do not have extraterritorial application, absent explicit 
provision for it.
37
  
V. THE FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS‘ ULTIMATE CONCERN MAY BE 
ABOUT USING THE UNIQUE U.S. CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES TO 
BRING NUMEROUS NON-RESIDENT FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS INTO 
U.S. COURTS TO CLAIM DAMAGES FOR FARAWAY TORTS 
There have been essentially two kinds of modern ATS cases:   
(1) an individual victim‘s claims against the individual wrongdoer(s) 
who mistreated him, and (2) class action claims against one or more 
foreign corporations for aiding and abetting a foreign government‘s 
widespread human rights abuses. The first category (―Individual 
Injury Cases‖) includes the landmark Second Circuit decision that 
ushered in the modern ATS litigation era, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,
38
 
and the Supreme Court‘s only prior effort to sort out what kinds of 
ATS claims could be made, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.
39
 The second 
category (―Foreign Group Redress Cases‖) is typified by Kiobel and 
by the class action cases brought on behalf of millions of South 
African residents against companies that had invested in South Africa 
during the apartheid era.
40
  
The Foreign Group Redress Cases seem to be much the more 
serious concern to foreign governments because these cases (1) have 
become the predominant form of ATS litigation, and (2) are so risky 
and expensive for the international corporations which foreign 
governments may often want to encourage to invest in poorer foreign 
countries. The Kiobel plaintiffs and their supporting amici have 
written quite a lot about the historic ―transitory tort‖ doctrine and 
why it supports their position, with particular emphasis on the Second 
Circuit‘s 1980 Filártiga decision.41 The ―transitory tort‖ doctrine, in 
 
36. See U.S. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 9, at 21 (suggesting that the Petitioner‘s situation 
may be different if U.S. courts were only exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction). 
37. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
38. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
39. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
40. See, e.g., In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
41. See, e.g., Supplemental Brief of Amici Curiae South African Jurists Anton Katz, Maz 
du Plessis, and Christopher Gevers, in Support of Petitioners at 6–12, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
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essence, holds that a forum state may adjudicate a dispute between 
foreign parties within its territory over a tort that may have occurred 
in a foreign jurisdiction, applying the law of the place of the wrong.
42
 
Filártiga was essentially such a case. Both parties were citizens 
of Paraguay, where the alleged wrongdoing took place. Both the 
defendant and the plaintiff were residing in the United States when 
the plaintiff brought the case.
43
 The only difference from the classic 
―transitory tort‖ case was that, by virtue of the ATS, the U.S. court 
applied ―the law of nations‖ rather than Paraguayan law to the 
tortious conduct that had occurred in Paraguay.
44
 
However, Filártiga (and Sosa too) have little to do with the 
realities of the Kiobel-type Foreign Group Redress Cases. If the only 
Kiobel plaintiffs were a handful of Nigerians resident in the United 
States, the case almost certainly would not be in the Supreme Court 
in 2013. Instead, it would probably have been treated as a transitory 
tort case to which Filártiga could be applied and a small ―U.S. 
resident Nigerians only‖ class could be employed.45 
But what had made Kiobel a source of great practical concern to 
foreign governments was the use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23 to certify a very large class of faraway plaintiffs with no nexus to 
the United States.
46
 
In this connection, it is important to remember how unique, and 
sometimes controversial, our U.S. class action system is around the 
world. No other country, I believe, has created an opt-out class action 
system without a ―loser pays‖ cost rule.47 Opt-out rules tend to create 
 
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) (describing the ―transitory tort 
doctrine‖ and its use in South Africa); Brief for the Government of the Argentine Republic 
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 33 (addressing Filártiga and 
Individual Injury Cases under international law and the Argentine Constitution). 
42. See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: 
Inquiries Into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 1, 68–69 (1985) 
(discussing the origins of the transitory tort doctrine and its application to ATS cases).  
43. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878–79. 
44. Id. at 878. 
45. The fact that Kiobel, like Filártiga, originated in the Second Circuit makes it even 
more likely that the earlier precedent would have been applied in this way.  
46. See Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 3, at 28. 
47. The Canadian province of British Columbia comes closest to providing an exception 
to this generalization. It does provide opt-out class actions, without requiring the losing 
plaintiffs to pay the defendants‘ litigation costs in such cases. However, this remedy is only 
for classes of British Columbia residents. Canada‘s other provinces generally have opt-out 
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much larger classes of plaintiffs, which are often more difficult to 
manage than a class in an opt-in class action system.
48
 Moreover, 
certification of a large class greatly increases the economic pressures 
on defendants to settle even potentially defensible cases.
49
 Many 
countries, as well as the European Commission, consider some form 
of collective redress desirable, but none has thought that the U.S. 
approach is correct.
50
 Instead, almost every country that has 
authorized collective actions has adopted some form of opt-in class 
action or representative action, nearly always coupled with the 
jurisdiction‘s normal ―loser pays‖ cost rule, which is seen as a 
safeguard against weak or frivolous litigation.
51
 The two major 
exceptions are Australia and the Netherlands, which have created opt-
out class actions, but still with ―loser pays‖ cost rules.52 
 
class actions covering their own residents, and with varying cost rules. Thus, Canada‘s 
largest province, Ontario, has a ―loser pays‖ cost rule which enables the defendant to recover 
costs either when the representative plaintiffs fail at the initial class certification stage of an 
opt-out class action or when the class action fails. The third major province, Quebec, permits 
only very limited cost recovery by a successful defendant in an opt-out class action. Unlike 
the United States, Canada does not have a nationwide system of federal trial courts and thus 
even major securities and antitrust litigation against a nationwide wrong still can end up 
being pursued via different, parallel class actions in the different provincial courts under 
their varied rules, rather than being consolidated in a single court as tends to happen in the 
United States under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1404 and 1407.  
48. See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and 
Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 
1529 (2004) (discussing broadly the issues surrounding the opt-out doctrine). 
49. See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 259 F.3d 154, 163–64 (3d Cir. 2001) (―An order 
granting certification . . . may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of 
defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability.‖ (citing Comm. 
Note, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f))).  
50. See Toward a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress: Next Steps, ¶¶ 6, 
17, SEC (2010) 1192 final (Oct. 5, 2010) (―Mechanisms of collective redress could be 
considered . . . to remedy the current shortcomings in the enforcement of EU law. . . . Any 
European approach to collective redress would have to avoid from the outset the risk of 
abusive litigation. Such abuses have occurred in the US with its ‗class actions‘ system. This 
form of collective redress contains strong economic incentives for parties to bring a case to 
court even if, on the merits, it is not well founded. These incentives are the result of a 
combination of several factors, in particular, the availability of punitive damages, the 
absence of limitations as regards standing (virtually anybody can bring an action on behalf of 
an open class of injured parties) the possibility of contingency fees for attorney and the 
wide-ranging discovery procedure for procuring evidence. Because of the increased risk of 
abusive litigation resulting from these combined incentives, we believe that these features 
are not compatible with the European legal tradition. We therefore firmly oppose introducing 
„class actions‟ along the US model into the EU legal order.‖). 
51. See Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 3, at 28. 
52. Australia authorizes class actions, but they are subject to the normal Australian ―loser 
pays‖ cost rules. Federal Court of Australia Amendment Act 1991 (Cth) (Austl.), discussed 
in Brief of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia as Amicus Curiae in Support 
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Kiobel and other Foreign Group Redress cases thus differ from 
the antitrust, securities, and labor standards cases that have occupied 
the Supreme Court for the past two decades.
53
 In those cases, foreign 
governments were very much concerned about the U.S. class action 
plaintiffs seeking to export U.S. substantive law for use in 
adjudicating overseas disputes among foreign parties—thereby 
effectively foreclosing the more balanced remedies that they have 
chosen for their own courts.
54
 Foreign governments supported the 
Supreme Court‘s modern presumption against extraterritorial 
application of law, absent clear contrary intent from Congress. In the 
ATS cases, there is no disagreement that the substantive law is 
international public law as embodied in federal common law, and the 
controversial export is U.S. procedures that generate large classes of 
non-resident plaintiffs suing foreign defendants for wrongs that occur 
overseas.
55
  
The supporters of the Kiobel plaintiffs seem to have assumed 
that once you have a few representative class plaintiffs resident in the 
United States, you have a ―transitory tort case,‖ and, after that, 
everything is governed by the procedural rules of the forum, i.e. 
Rule 23. This totally ignores considerations of international comity 
when dealing with a unique procedural rule that totally changes the 
nature of the case. Then, it seems that one must look at the 
―substance vs. procedure‖ distinction, as federal courts were required 
to do in the wake of the Supreme Court‘s landmark decision in Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.
56
 
 
of the Defendants–Appellees at 17–23, Morrison v. Nat‘l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 
(2010) (No. 08-1191). 
53. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (employment practices); 
F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (antitrust and trade 
regulation); Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2869 (securities law). 
54. For example, no foreign system provides the mandatory treble damages or one-way 
cost recovery rule for antitrust violations that are contained in Section 4 of the Clayton Act. 
15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).  
55. See Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 3, at 27–28 (outlining the procedural 
advantages for plaintiffs in U.S. courts).  
56. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). What this post-Erie distinction seems to amount to in practice is 
that, if the rule in question essentially changes the outcome, it is regarded as ―substantive‖ so 
that the state rule will prevail. See id. at 78. 
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VI. THE U.S. SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
OFFERED SOME TAILORED VARIATIONS ON EXTRATERRITORIAL 
JURISDICTION IN THEIR AMICUS BRIEFS IN KIOBEL  
The second U.S. Brief was reasonably close to the Neth.–U.K. 
Brief and was labeled as being ―in Partial Support of Affirmance.‖57 
The Solicitor General recommended affirmance of the dismissal 
because:  
In this case, foreign plaintiffs are suing foreign 
corporate defendants for aiding and abetting a foreign 
sovereign‘s treatment of its own citizens and in its 
own territory, without any connection to the United 
Sates beyond the residence of the named plaintiffs in 
this putative class action and the corporate defendants‘ 
presence for jurisdictional purposes. Creating a federal 
common-law cause of action in these circumstances 
would not be consistent with Sosa‘s requirement of 
judicial restraint.
58
 
After noting the numerous foreign government protests against 
U.S. assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction in ATS cases, the U.S. 
Brief added a comity-sensitive point: ―The ‗great caution‘ urged in 
Sosa counsels against recognizing a federal common-law cause of 
action that has the inherent potential to provoke the international 
friction the ATS was designed to prevent.‖59 
The U.S. Brief also emphasized that ―[t]his case is quite different 
from Filártiga. The United States could not be viewed as having 
harbored or otherwise provided refuge to an actual torturer or other 
‗enemy of all mankind.‘‖60 But the Solicitor General added that the 
Filártigia plaintiffs would still have a cause of action for overseas 
wrongs under the Torture Victims Protection Act—which the U.S. 
Brief described as ―an express, but carefully circumscribed, cause of 
action available only against an individual for acts of torture or 
 
57. U.S. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 9.   
58. Id. at 13–14. 
59. Id. at 18. 
60. Id. at 19. The U.S. State Department had been giving Filártiga a much broader 
reading in its prior dialogue with foreign governments. Interestingly, the State Department 
was not a party to the second U.S. Brief, although it appeared on the first U.S. Brief 
supporting the Kiobel plaintiffs on the issue of corporate liability. 
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extrajudicial killing and only when acting under color of foreign 
law.‖61  
Finally, the U.S. Brief left open the possibility of the Supreme 
Court recognizing extraterritorial jurisdiction in ATS cases ―where 
the defendant is a U.S. national or corporation, or where the alleged 
conduct of the foreign sovereign occurred outside its territory, or 
where conduct by others occurred within the U.S. or on the high 
seas.‖62   
The brief that the European Commission filed ―on Behalf of the 
European Union‖ supported neither side, but it was closer to the 
plaintiffs‘ position on extraterritorial jurisdiction than the U.S. Brief 
was.
63
 In particular, the E.U. Brief advocated allowing in ATS cases 
―the exercise of universal jurisdiction to reach conduct and parties 
with no nexus to the United States—but only when the conduct at 
issue could also give rise to universal criminal jurisdiction.‖64 The 
E.U. Brief explained that such ―[u]niversal jurisdiction is . . . founded 
on the sheer reprehensibility of certain crimes of universal concern 
which international law permits States to punish without regard to 
territoriality or the nationality of the offenders.‖65 The European 
Commission precedents that were cited in support of using universal 
criminal jurisdiction to justify universal civil jurisdiction under 
international law were found principally in a few U.S. lower court 
ATS decisions in cases where the United Kingdom or other foreign 
governments had appeared as amici to argue against such a rule.
66
   
 
61. Id. at 20–21. The Torture Victims Protection Act clearly does not cover the type of 
Foreign Group Injury claims against corporations that are alleged in Kiobel. See Mohamad v. 
Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012) (rejecting organizational liability under the Torture 
Victims Protection Act ). 
62. U.S. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 9, at 21. This vague language was presumably inserted 
to mollify the Legal Adviser‘s Office at the State Department, which has had a more 
expansive view of international jurisdiction in ATS cases. See supra note 60.  
63. Brief of the European Commission on Behalf of the European Union as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 
(2013) (No. 10-1491) [hereinafter E.U. Brief]. 
64. Id. at 4. 
65. Id. at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
66. The E.U. Brief cites several examples, the most recent being Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 
671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 
1995 (2013), dismissed on other grounds, Nos. 02–56256, 02–56390, 09–56381, 2013 WL 
3357740 (9th Cir. June 28, 2013). See E.U. Brief, supra note 63, at 3, 23, 32. In Sarei, the 
U.K. and Australian Governments filed two amicus briefs opposing U.S. jurisdiction at 
different stages of the interminable Ninth Circuit process, and then wrote a third joint brief to 
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There is no unanimity among the E.U. Member States on the 
E.U. Brief‘s assertion regarding universal civil jurisdiction. The E.U. 
Brief is subject to classic international lawyers‘ criticism as being too 
hasty in attempting to extrapolate a controversial principle of 
universal civil jurisdiction from a well-established principle of 
universal criminal jurisdiction. International law does not develop 
this way; rather, it requires sufficient evidence of state practice and 
opinio juris, which are still lacking in the area of universal civil 
jurisdiction.
67
 
 Moreover, the European Commission‘s ―universal jurisdiction‖ 
proposal, if accepted, would often cause practical difficulties for a 
U.S. district court. In addition to a class certification proceeding 
under Rule 23, the court would be required to conduct an initial mini-
trial over its jurisdiction to determine whether the wrongs alleged by 
the plaintiffs sufficiently meet the European Commission‘s ―sheer 
reprehensibility‖ threshold standard, and thus qualify for ―criminal‖ 
liability under international law. This would not necessarily be a 
quick or easy task for the court, given the likely absence of foreign 
witnesses or documents in such cases. 
Both the E.U. Brief and the second U.S. Brief do broadly agree 
on an important point that ATS plaintiffs generally oppose: ―If a 
federal common-law cause of action is created under the ATS for 
extraterritorial violations of the law of nations in certain 
circumstances, doctrines such as exhaustion [of foreign remedies] 
and forum non-conveniens should be applied at the outset of the 
litigation and with special force.‖68 The British, Dutch, and 
 
the Supreme Court supporting the Defendant‘s petition for certiorari challenging the Ninth 
Circuit‘s 6-5 en banc decision in favor of universal jurisdiction. See Austl.–U.K. Rio Tinto 
Cert. Br., supra note 5, at 1–4. Immediately following Kiobel, the Supreme Court granted the 
petition for certiorari in Rio Tinto and remanded the case for reconsideration in the light of it 
Kiobel decision. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) (mem.).  
67. The E.U. Brief also overlooks the practical reality that the instigators of civil and 
criminal litigation have entirely different roles and responsibilities, even where the 
underlying wrong may be the same. In the criminal context, the prosecutor is a public 
official holding a judicial or executive office. In the civil context of an ATS class action case 
in the United States, the plaintiffs‘ counsel is likely to be a legal entrepreneur specializing in 
class action litigation, often on a contingent fee basis. The two are not remotely comparable. 
The private class action counsel need not respond to concerns of comity vis-à-vis foreign 
governments, or the broader political concerns that such a case might cause for other U.S. 
interests (e.g., retaliatory boycotts or trade reprisals).  
68. U.S. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 9, at 22. The European Commission has consistently 
articulated that ―before the United States may exercise universal jurisdiction under the ATS, 
international law requires exhaustion of local and international remedies or, alternatively, the 
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Australian governments repeatedly made this argument in their 
amicus briefs.
69
 
Moreover, the European Commission makes a point clear that is 
implicit in the U.S. Brief—namely that it is not only exhaustion of 
local remedies in the place where the challenged wrong allegedly 
occurred, but also in the jurisdiction where a defendant‘s enterprise is 
principally based. Thus, the E.U. Brief quoted with approval an 
earlier German brief in the Kiobel case that stated: 
While it certainly would be inappropriate to require 
plaintiffs to exhaust their legal remedies in countries 
which have a proven record of human rights violations 
and no due process, it is certainly reasonable and 
appropriate to require a victim of a tort committed in 
a third country by a German tortfeasor to go to 
Germany and utilize the legal system of the Federal 
Republic of Germany to seek legal satisfaction.
70
 
The Netherlands and United Kingdom also urged that U.S. 
courts, in applying the ―exhaustion of remedies‖ principle in an ATS 
case, look beyond the place of the wrong and ―ought to be obliged to 
consider whether another state has a closer nexus to the dispute—
namely, superior access to evidence and/or the presence of nationals 
or residents as defendants within its jurisdiction.‖71 Their brief 
explained when the British and Dutch national courts would accept 
jurisdiction over alleged human rights injuries caused by their 
corporations of subsidiaries.
72
 
Finally, using slightly different language, both the E.U. and U.S. 
briefs recognized the importance of the ―substantial interests of other 
sovereigns in adjudicating disputes over incidents occurring in their 
own territory, or involving their own nationals outside the United 
States‖ because doing so ―would help to mitigate the potential for 
 
claimant‘s demonstration that such remedies are unavailable or their pursuit is futile.‖ E.U. 
Brief, supra note 63, at 30 
69. See Austl.–U.K. Rio Tinto Cert. Br., supra note 5, at 15–18; Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. I, 
supra note 6, at 33–34. 
70. E.U. Brief, supra note 63, at 32 n.82 (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae the Federal 
Republic of Germany in Support of Respondents at 13, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) [hereinafter Ger. Kiobel Br.]) (emphasis added) 
71. Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 3, at 34. 
72. Id. at 18–23. 
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international friction arising from the recognition of an extraterritorial 
cause of action based on the ATS.‖73  
VII. CONCLUSION: POLITICS, LAW, AND EMOTIONS IN AN EVER MORE 
INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 
A broad, loosely organized human rights community around the 
world has invested much energy and emotion into the Kiobel case 
and ATS litigation in U.S. courts.
74
 Strong campaigns have been 
mounted against foreign governments that were participating as amici 
in the Kiobel case or considering whether to do so.
75
 The decibel 
level increased substantially after the Court accepted the 
jurisdictional argument emphasized by the Dutch and British 
Governments in their first Kiobel brief and took the rare step of 
setting the case down for rebriefing and reargument on the question: 
Whether and under what circumstances the Alien Tort 
Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows courts to recognize a 
cause of action for violations of the law of nations 
occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than 
the United States.
76
 
In the shrill debates that swirled through various national 
capitals in the wake of the Supreme Court‘s reargument order, the 
question seemed to be: ―How could a democratic government that 
purports to be seriously concerned about human rights violations 
possibly be willing to support any corporation in a major lawsuit 
where it is charged with having committed major human rights 
violations?‖77 
 
73. U.S. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 9, at 25–26; see also E.U. Brief, supra note 63, at 4–5. 
74. See, e.g., Brief on Reargument of Amici Curiae International Human Rights 
Organizations in Support of Petitioners, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491). 
75. Germany, which had submitted a brief supporting respondents during the first round 
of briefing in Kiobel, did not participate in the second round of briefing on jurisdiction. The 
German brief was quoted in the E.U. Brief on a significant jurisdictional point, during the 
second round of Kiobel briefing. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. The reasons for 
Germany‘s decision not to participate in the second round of Kiobel briefing were not 
announced, but the choice occurred right in the middle of the period when the human rights 
community was generating public criticism against foreign governments for having opposed 
U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction in Kiobel and other ATS cases. 
76. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (mem.).  
77. See Geoffrey Robertson, Why Does the U.K. Defend Corporations and Not Their 
Victims?, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 10, 2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/ 
voices/comment/why-does-the-uk-defend-corporations-and-not-their-victims-8399557.html 
(criticizing the British Government for its Kiobel amicus briefs, asserting that ―[t]he only 
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The answer—a good appellate lawyer‘s answer—is that ―it is all 
about important principles, not particular parties or the emotions that 
they generate.‖78 Common-law-trained lawyers are well-aware of the 
historic reality that some of the great principles of constitutional law 
have been established in cases where one feels no emotional 
sympathy for the party who successfully raised the seminal point.
79
 
Conversely, we can think of famous cases where the law would have 
been better served if the court had been less sympathetic to a 
prevailing party.
80
  
For the U.S. class action lawyers interested in human rights, a 
Kiobel-type Foreign Group Redress Case may seem to be their only 
option in dealing directly with foreign human rights wrongs, and for 
their overseas political supporters, the plaintiff-favoring U.S. 
litigation system may seem the best option for making somebody pay 
a lot of money for collective human tragedy.
81
 By contrast, 
governments committed to alleviating human rights wrongs have a 
much broader range of legitimate options for dealing with the types 
of government-supported human rights abuses that rise to the level of 
being potential violations of international law. These options include: 
state-to-state litigation before international courts, supporting 
criminal prosecutions before the International Criminal Court, 
unilateral or collective diplomacy vis-à-vis the offending 
government, cutting off foreign aid or normal trade relationships, and 
 
redress is to sue in the U.S. under [ATS] a unique statute which permits victims from 
anywhere in the world to sue any company or person for a wrong ‗committed in violation of 
the law of the nations.‘‖). 
78. Cf. Monroe H. Freedman, The Lawyer‟s Moral Obligation of Justification, 74 TEX. L. 
REV. 111 (1995) (discussing the defense attorney‘s obligation to represent not only the 
purely innocent but also the despicable). 
79. The most obvious examples are in criminal cases where the defendant, who clearly 
appears to have been guilty, has his conviction reversed because the police or the prosecutors 
have obtained evidence in some constitutionally impermissible way. See, e.g., Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
80. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Cont‘l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 705 (1967) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (―[I]f we assume that the price discrimination proven against the respondents had 
any effect on competition, that effect must have been beneficent. . . . [T]he Court has fallen 
into the error of reading the [statute] as protecting competitors, instead of 
competition . . . .‖).  
81. See Robertson, supra note 77 (―If companies cannot be prosecuted for international 
crimes, all the more reason they should be sued for damages. The profits of their illegal 
conduct should be re-distributed to their victims.‖). 
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even occasional military intervention.
82
 In such circumstances, 
concerned governments, including the U.S. government, are very 
likely to see private class actions in the U.S. courts against non-state 
actors as a less effective way to deal with most serious human rights 
wrongs.
83
 
Kiobel has been the latest battle in which numerous foreign 
governments have urged jurisdictional restraint on the U.S. courts. In 
their Kiobel briefs, the British and Dutch governments went out of 
their way to emphasize that they were focusing on the fundamental 
question of ―why is this case even in a U.S. court when it has no 
connection to the United States?‖—without taking any position on 
the underlying claims against Royal Dutch Petroleum. 
As noted above, the foreign governments have been more 
successful since 2000 in urging an increasingly conservative U.S. 
Supreme Court to adopt rules that tend to restrain the jurisdictional 
appetite of foreign plaintiffs bringing claims in the U.S. courts.
84
 
Cases like Empagran and Morrison have involved large opt-out class 
action claims of the type that these foreign governments have chosen 
not to authorize in their own courts.
85
 Having adopted some fairly 
clear comity-driven rules to limited U.S. forum shopping by counsel 
for overseas victims of alleged international antitrust and securities 
abuses, the Supreme Court might reasonably have been expected to 
ask: when, if ever, should an ATS class action case be allowed to 
proceed to trial without the kind of factual nexus that has long been 
recognized as necessary for a national court to exercise civil 
jurisdiction under traditional international law? (The answer of the 
Court‘s five-member conservative majority in Kiobel appears to be 
somewhere between ―never‖ and ―hardly ever‖ on a narrow negative 
spectrum.)
86
 
 
82. See generally Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization 
and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 630–33 (2004) (outlining various 
mechanisms to enforce human rights laws and principles). 
83. See Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 3, at 35 (―[I]t has been the longstanding 
view of the Governments that the most effective way to ensure that there is no impunity for 
human rights abuses is to encourage and strengthen States to comply with the human rights 
obligations owed to those within their jurisdictions.‖). 
84. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.  
85. As noted, Australia does allow opt-out class actions, but subject to the country‘s 
normal ―loser pays‖ cost rule. See supra note 52. 
86. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (―We therefore 
conclude that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and 
nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption. . . . And even where the claims touch and 
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The bottom line, as seen from outside the United States, 
essentially seems to be this: human rights abuses are a very important 
international concern, but the United States ought to be looking more 
to multilateral cooperation—as it has done in the torture victims area, 
but failed to do with the International Criminal Court—rather than 
just relying on highly-motivated private lawyers to bring broad class 
action cases against foreign corporations on behalf of non-resident 
victims for conduct having no effect within the United States. Thus, 
for the Dutch and British governments, the ultimate principle was to 
respect the jurisdictional restraints that international law has imposed 
and continues to impose on national governments and national courts 
because ―[j]urisdictional restraints are a fundamental underpinning 
of the international legal order and are essential to maintaining 
international peace and comity.‖87 
 
concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace 
the presumption against extraterritorial application.‖). 
87. Neth.–U.K. Kiobel Br. II, supra note 3, at 2 (emphasis added). 
